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Abstract
Partisan gerrymandering is a major cause for voter disenfranchisement in United States. However,
convincing US courts to adopt specific measures to quantify gerrymandering has been of limited success
to date. Recently, McGhee in [23] and Stephanopoulos and McGhee in [29] introduced a new and pre-
cise measure of partisan gerrymandering via the so-called ”efficiency gap” that computes the absolutes
difference of wasted votes between two political parties in a two-party system. Quite importantly from a
legal point of view, this measure was found legally convincing enough in a US appeals court in a case that
claims that the legislative map of the state of Wisconsin was gerrymandered; the case is now pending in
US Supreme Court (Gill v. Whitford, US Supreme Court docket no 16-1161, decision pending). In this
article, we show the following:
. We provide interesting mathematical and computational complexity properties of the problem of
minimizing the efficiency gap measure. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first non-trivial
theoretical and algorithmic analyses of this measure of gerrymandering.
. We provide a simple and fast algorithm that can “un-gerrymander” the district maps for the states
of Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania by bring their efficiency gaps to acceptable levels
from the current unacceptable levels. Our work thus shows that, notwithstanding the general worst-
case approximation hardness of the efficiency gap measure as shown by us, finding district maps
with acceptable levels of efficiency gaps is a computationally tractable problem from a practical
point of view. Based on these empirical results, we also provide some interesting insights into three
practical issues related the efficiency gap measure.
We believe that, should the US Supreme Court uphold the decision of lower courts, our research work
and software will provide a crucial supporting hand to remove partisan gerrymandering.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Gerrymandering, namely creation of district plans with highly asymmetric electoral outcomes to disenfran-
chise voters, has continued to be a curse to fairness of electoral systems in USA for a long time in spite of
*The raw data reported in this paper are archived at http://www.cs.uic.edu/∼dasgupta/gerrymander/index.html. The source code
of our implemented program will be eventually made freely available from the same website after formal publication. All the
authors declare no competing interests.
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general public disdain for it. Even though the US Supreme Court ruled in 1986 [11] that gerrymandering
is justiciable, they could not agree on an effective way of estimating it. Indeed, a huge impediment to re-
moving gerrymandering lies in formulating an effective and precise measure for it that will be acceptable in
courts.
In 2006, the US Supreme Court opined [21] that a measure of partisan symmetry may be a helpful tool
to understand and remedy gerrymandering. Partisan symmetry is a standard for defining partisan gerryman-
dering that involves the computation of counterfactuals typically under the assumption of uniform swings.
To illustrate lack of partisan symmetry consider a two-party voting district and suppose that Party A wins
by getting 60% of total votes and 70% of total seats. In such a case, a partisan symmetry standard would
hold if Party B would also win 70% of the seats had it won 60% of the votes in a hypothetical election.
Two frequent indicators cited for lack of partisan symmetry are cracking, namely dividing supporters of a
specific party between two or more districts when they could be a majority in a single district, and packing,
namely filling a district with more and more supporters of a specific party as long as this does not make this
specific party the winner in that district.
There have been many theoretical and empirical attempts at remedying the lack of partisan symmetry
by “quantifying” gerrymandering and devising redistricting methods to optimize such quantifications us-
ing well-known notions such as compactness and symmetry [3, 6–8, 16, 18, 25, 26]. Since it is often simply
not possible to go over every possible redistricting map to optimize the gerrymandering measure due to
rapid combinatorial explosion, researchers such as [7, 22, 30] have also investigated designing efficient al-
gorithmic approach for this purpose. In particular, a popular gerrymandering measure in the literature is
symmetry, which attempts to quantify the discrepancy between the share of votes and the share of seats of a
party [3, 16, 18, 26]. In spite of such efforts, their success in convincing courts to adopt one or more of these
measures has been unfortunately somewhat limited to date.
Recently, researchers Stephanopoulos and McGhee in two papers [23, 29] have introduced a new gerry-
mandering measure called the “efficiency gap”. Informally speaking, the efficiency gap measure attempts to
minimize the absolute difference of total wasted votes between the parties in a two-party electoral system.
This measure is very promising in several aspects. Firstly, it provides a mathematically precise measure of
gerrymandering with many desirable properties. Equally importantly, at least from a legal point of view, this
measure was found legally convincing in a US appeals court in a case that claims that the legislative map of
the state of Wisconsin is gerrymandered; the case is now pending in US Supreme Court [17].
1.1 Informal Overview of Our Contribution and Its Significance
Redistricting based on minimizing the efficiency gap measure however requires one to find a solution to an
combinatorial optimization problem. To this effect, the contribution of this article is as follows:
. As a necessary first step towards investigating the efficiency gap measure, in Section 2 we first for-
malize the optimization problem that corresponds to minimizing the efficiency gap measure.
. Subsequently, in Section 3 we study the mathematical properties of the formalized version of the
measure. Specifically, Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 show that the efficiency gap measure attains only a
finite discrete set of rational values; these properties are of considerable importance in understanding
the sensitivity of the measure and in designing efficient algorithms for computing this measure.
. Next, in Sections 4 and 5 we investigate computational complexity and algorithm design issues of
redistricting based on the efficiency gap measure. Although Theorem 4 shows that in theory one can
construct artificial pathological examples for which designing efficient algorithms is provably hard,
Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 provide justification as to why the result in Theorem 4 is overly pes-
simistic for real data that do not necessarily correspond to these pathological examples. For example,
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assuming that the districts are geometrically compact (y-convex in our terminology), Theorem 11
shows how to find a district map efficiently in polynomial time that minimizes the efficiency gap.
. Finally, to show that it is indeed possible in practice to solve the problem of minimization of the
efficiency gap, in Section 6 we design a fast randomized algorithm based on the local search paradigm
in combinatorial optimization for this problem (cf. Fig. 4). Our resulting software was tested on four
electoral data for the 2012 election of the (federal) house of representatives for the US states of
Wisconsin [35, 36], Texas [37, 38], Virginia [33, 34] and Pennsylvania [31, 32]. The results computed
by our fast algorithm are truly outstanding: the final efficiency gap was lowered to 3.80%, 3.33%,
3.61% and 8.64% from 14.76%, 4.09%, 22.25% and 23.80% for Wisconsin, Texas, Virginia and
Pennsylvania, respectively, in a small amount of time. Our empirical results clearly show that it is
very much possible to design and implement a very fast algorithm that can “un-gerrymander” (with
respect to the efficiency gap measure) the gerrymandered US house districts of four US states.
Based on these empirical results, we also provide some interesting insights into three practical issues
related the efficiency gap measure, namely issues pertaining to seat gain vs. efficiency gap, compact-
ness vs. efficiency gap and the naturalness of original gerrymandered districts.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are first algorithmic analysis and implementation of minimization of
the efficiency gap measure. Our results show that it is practically feasible to redraw district maps in a small
amount of time to remove gerrymandering based on the efficiency gap measure. Thus, should the Supreme
Court uphold the ruling of the lower court, our algorithm and its implementation will be a necessary and
valuable asset to remove partisan gerrymandering.
1.2 Beyond scientific curiosity: impact on US judicial system
Beyond its scientific implications on the science of gerrymandering, we expect our algorithmic analysis and
results to have a beneficial impact on the US judicial system also. Some justices, whether at the Supreme
Court level or in lower courts, seem to have a reluctance to taking mathematics, statistics and computing
seriously [12, 28], For example, during the hearing in our previously cite most recent US Supreme Court case
on gerrymandering [17], some justices opined that the math was unwieldy, complicated, and newfangled.
One justice called it baloney, and Chief Justice John Roberts dismissed the attempts to quantify partisan
gerrymandering by saying
“It may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe it as sociological gob-
bledygook.”
Our theoretical and computational results show that the math, whether complicated or not (depending
on one’s background), can in fact yield fast accurate computational methods that can indeed be applied to
un-gerrymander the currently gerrymandered maps.
1.3 Some Remarks and Explanations Regarding the Technical Content of This Paper
To avoid any possible misgivings or confusions regarding the technical content of the paper as well as to help
the reader towards understanding the remaining content of this article, we believe the following comments
and explanations may be relevant. We encourage the reader to read this section and explore the references
mentioned therein before proceeding further.
I We employ a randomized local-search heuristic for combinatorial optimization for our algorithm in
Fig. 4. Our algorithmic paradigm is quite different from Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation, sim-
ulated annealing approach, Bayesian methods and related similar other methods (e.g., no temperature
3
parameter, no Gibbs sampling, no calculation of transition probabilities based on Markov chain proper-
ties, etc.). Thus, for example, our algorithmic paradigm and analysis for the efficiency gap measure is
different and incomparable to that used by researchers for other different measure, such as by Herschlag,
Ravier and Mattingly [19], by Fifield et al. [13] or by Cho and Liu [8].
For a detailed exposition of randomized algorithms the reader is referred to excellent textbooks such as [2,
24] and for a detailed exposition of local-search algorithmic paradigm in combinatorial optimization the
reader is referred to the excellent textbook [1].
I While we do provide several non-trivial theoretical algorithmic results, we do not provide any theoretical
analysis of the randomized algorithm in Fig. 4. The justification for this is that, due to Theorem 4
and Lemma 12, no such non-trivial theoretical algorithmic complexity results exist in general assuming
P 6= NP for deterministic local-search algorithms or assuming RP 6= NP for randomized local-search
algorithms. One can attribute this to the usual “difference between theory and practice” doctrine.
For readers unfamiliar with the complexity-theoretic assumptions P6= NP and RP6= NP, these are core
complexity-theoretic assumptions that have been routinely used for decades in the field of algorithmic
complexity analysis. For example, starting with the famous Cook’s theorem [9] in 1971 and Karp’s
subsequent paper in 1972 [20], the P6= NP assumption is the central assumption in structural complexity
theory and algorithmic complexity analysis. For a detailed technical coverage of the basic structural
complexity field, we refer the reader to the excellent textbook [4].
I In this article we use the data at the county level as opposed to using data at finer (more granular) level
such as the “Voting Tabulation District” (VTD) level (VTDs are the smallest units in a state for which the
election data are available). The reason for this is as follows. Note that our algorithmic approach already
returns an efficiency gap of below 4% for three states (namely, WI, TX and VA), and for PA it cuts down
the current efficiency gap by a factor of about 3 (cf. Table 2). This, together with the observation in [29,
pp. 886-888] that the efficiency gap should not be minimized to a very low value to avoid unintended
consequences, shows that even just by using county-level data our algorithm can already output almost
desirable (if not truly desirable) values of the efficient gap measure and thus, by Occam’s razor principle1
widely used in computer science, we should not be using more data at finer levels. In fact, using more
data at a finer level may lead to what is popularly known as “overfitting” in the context of machine
learning and elsewhere [5] that may hide its true performance on yet unexplored maps. In this context,
our suggestion to future algorithmic researchers in this direction is to use a minimal amount of data that
is truly necessary to generate an acceptable solution.
I In this article we are not comparing our approaches empirically to those in existing literature such as
in [8, 13, 19]. The reason for this is that, to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no other published
work that gives a software to optimize the efficiency gap measure. In fact, it would be grossly unfair to
other existing approaches if we compare our results with their results. For example, suppose we consider
an optimal result using an approach from [8] and find that it gives an efficiency gap of 15% whereas
the approach in this article gives an efficiency gap of 5%. However, it would be grossly unfair to say
that, based on this comparison, our algorithm is better than the one in [8] since the authors in [8] never
intended to minimize the efficiency gap. Furthermore, even the two maps cannot be compared directly
by geometric methods since no court has so far established a firm and unequivocal ground truth on
gerrymandering by having a ruling of the following form:
[court]: “a district map is gerrymandered if and only if such-and-such conditions are satisfied”
1Occam’s razor principle [27] states that “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem” (i.e., more things should not be
used than are necessary). It is also known as rule of parsimony in biological context [14]. Overfitting is an example of violation of
this principle.
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(the line is crossed out above just to doubly clarify that such a ruling does not exist).
For certain scientific research problems, algorithmic comparisons are possible because of the existence
of ground truths (also called ”gold standards” or “benchmarks”). For example, different algorithmic
approaches for reverse engineering causal relationships between components of a biological cellular
system can be compared by evaluating how close the methods under investigation are in recovering known
gold standard networks using widely agreed upon metrics such as recall rates or precision values [10].
Unfortunately, for gerrymandering this is not the case and, in our opinion, comparison of algorithms for
gerrymandering that optimize substantially different objectives should be viewed with a grain of salt.
I The main research goal of this paper is to minimize the efficiency gap measure exactly as introduced by
Stephanopoulos and McGhee in [23, 29]. However, should future researchers like to introduce additional
computable constraints or objectives, such as compactness or respect of community boundaries, on top
of our efficiency gap minimization algorithm, it is a conceptually easy task to modify our algorithm in
Fig. 4 for this purpose. For example, to introduce compactness on top of minimization of the efficiency
gap measure, the following two lines in Fig. 4
if Effgapκ(P,Q′1, . . . ,Q′κ) < Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) then
should be changed to something like (changes are indicated in bold):
if Effgapκ(P,Q′1, . . . ,Q′κ) < Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ)
and each ofQ′1, . . . ,Q′κ are compact then
and appropriate minor changes can be made to other parts of the algorithm for consistency with this
modification.
2 Formalization of the Optimization Problem to Minimize the Efficiency
Gap Measure
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
p2,1
|P| = 15
Figure 1: Input polygon P of size 15 placed on a grid of size 6× 4; the cell p2,1 is shown.
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Based on [23, 29], we abstract our problem in the following manner. We are given a rectilinear polygon
P without holes. Placing P on a unit grid of size m×n, we will identify an individual unit square (a “cell”)
on the ith row and jth column in P by pi,j for 0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n (see Fig. 1). For each cell
pi,j ∈ P , we are given the following three integers:
I an integer Popi,j ≥ 0 (the “total population” inside pi,j), and
I two integers PartyAi,j ,PartyBi,j ≥ 0 (the total number of voters for Party A and Party B, respec-
tively) such that PartyAi,j + PartyBi,j = Popi,j .
Let |P| = | {pi,j : pi,j ∈ P} | denote the “size” (number of cells) ofP . For a rectilinear polygonQ included
in the interior of P (i.e., a connected subset of the interior of P), we defined the following quantities:
Party affiliations in Q: PartyA(Q) = ∑pi,j∈Q PartyAi,j and PartyB(Q) = ∑pi,j∈Q PartyBi,j .
Population of Q: Pop(Q) = PartyA(Q) + PartyB(Q).
Efficiency gap of Q: Effgap(Q) =
(
PartyA(Q)− 12Pop(Q)
)
− PartyB(Q) = 2PartyA(Q)− 32Pop(Q), if PartyA(Q) ≥ 12Pop(Q)
PartyA(Q)−
(
PartyB(Q)− 12Pop(Q)
)
= 2PartyA(Q)− 12Pop(Q), otherwise
Note that if PartyA(Q) = PartyB(Q) = 12Pop(Q) then Effgap(Q) = −PartyB(Q), i.e., in case of a
tie, we assume Party A is the winner. Also, note that Effgap(Q) = 0 if and only if either PartyA(Q) =
Pop(Q)/4 or PartyB(Q) = Pop(Q)/4.
Our problem can now be defined as follows.
Problem name: κ-district Minimum Wasted Vote Problem (MIN-WVPκ).
Input: a rectilinear polygon P with Popi,j ,PartyAi,j ,PartyBi,j for every cell pi,j ∈ P , and a
positive integer 1 < κ ≤ |P|.
Definition: a κ-equipartition of P is a partition of the interior of P into exactly κ rectilinear poly-
gons, say Q1, . . . ,Qκ, such that Pop(Q1) = · · · = Pop(Qκ).
Assumption: P has at least one κ-equipartition.
Valid solution: Any κ-equipartition Q1, . . . ,Qκ of P .
Objective: minimize the total absolute efficiency gap2Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) =∣∣∣∑κj=1 Effgap(Qj) ∣∣∣.
Notation: OPTκ(P) def= min {Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) | Q1, . . . ,Qκ is a κ-equipartition of P }.
3 Mathematical Properties of Efficiency Gaps: Set of Values Attainable by
the Efficiency Gap Measure
The following lemma sheds some light on the set of rational numbers that the total efficiency gap of a κ-
equipartition can take. As an illustrative example, if we just partition the polygon P into κ = 2 regions,
2Note that our notation uses the absolute value for Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) but not for individual Effgap(Qj)’s.
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then Effgap2(P,Q1,Q2) can only be one of the following 3 possible values:∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− 12 Pop(P)
∣∣∣∣ or | 2 PartyA(P)− Pop(P) | or ∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− 32 Pop(P)
∣∣∣∣
Lemma 1
(a) For any κ-equipartition Q1, . . . ,Qκ of P , Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) always assumes one of the κ + 1
values of the form
∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− (z + κ2)Pop(P)κ ∣∣∣ for z = 0, 1, . . . , κ.
(b) If Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) =
∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− (z + κ2)Pop(P)κ ∣∣∣ for some z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , κ} and some
κ-equipartition Q1, . . . ,Qκ of P , then Pop(P)2κ z ≤ PartyA(P) ≤ Pop(P)2κ z + 12Pop(P).
Proof. To prove (a), consider any κ-equipartition Q1, . . . ,Qκ of P with Pop(Q1) = . . .Pop(Qκ) =
1
κPop(P). Note that for any Qj we have Effgap(Qj) = 2PartyA(Qj)− rjPop(Q) where
rj =
{
3/2, if PartyA(Qj) ≥ Pop(Qj)/(2κ)
1/2, otherwise
Letting z be the number of rj’s that are equal to 3/2, it follows that
Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
κ∑
j=1
Effgap(Qj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ 2PartyA(P)− (32z + 12(κ− z))Pop(P)κ
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− (z + κ2)Pop(P)κ
∣∣∣∣
To prove (b), note that, since 0 ≤ PartyA(Qj) ≤ Pop(P)κ for any j, we have PartyA(P) =
∑κ
j=1 PartyA(Qj) ≥∑
j : rj=3/2
Pop(P)
2κ =
Pop(P)
2κ z and PartyA(P) =
∑κ
j=1 PartyA(Qj) <
∑
j : rj=3/2
Pop(P)
κ +
∑
j : rj=1/2
Pop(P)
2κ =
Pop(P)
κ z +
Pop(P)
2κ (κ− z) = Pop(P)2κ z + 12Pop(P). q
Corollary 2 Using the reverse triangle inequality of norms, the absolute difference between two successive
values of Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) is given by∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− ( zκ − 12
)
Pop(P)
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(P)− (z + 1κ − 12
)
Pop(P)
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ( 2 PartyA(P)− ( zκ − 12
)
Pop(P)
)
−
(
2 PartyA(P)−
(
z + 1
κ
− 1
2
)
Pop(P)
) ∣∣∣∣ = Pop(P)κ
Corollary 3 (see also [29, p. 853]) For any κ-equipartitionQ1, . . . ,Qκ of P , consider the following quan-
tities as defined in [29]:
(Normalized) seat margin of Party A:
∣∣{Qj : PartyA(Qj)≥ 12Pop(Qj)}∣∣
κ − 12 .
(Normalized) vote margin of Party A: PartyA(P)Pop(P) − 12 .
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Then, we can write
2 PartyA(P)−
(
z+κ
2
)
Pop(P)
κ
Pop(P) as 2
(
PartyA(P)
Pop(P) − 12
)
− ( zκ − 12), and identifying z with the
quantity
∣∣ {Qj : PartyA(Qj) ≥ 12Pop(Qj)} ∣∣ we get
Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ)
Pop(P) =
∣∣ 2× ( vote margin of Party A )− ( seat margin of Party A ) ∣∣
4 Approximation Hardness Result for MIN-WVPκ
Recall that, for any ρ ≥ 1, an approximation algorithm with an approximation ratio of ρ (or, simply an ρ-
approximation) is a polynomial-time solution of value at most ρ times the value of an optimal solution [15].
Theorem 4 Assuming P 6= NP, for any rational constant ε ∈ (0, 1), the MIN-WVPκ problem for a rectilin-
ear polygon P does not admit a ρ-approximation algorithm for any ρ and all 2 ≤ κ ≤ ε|P|.
Remark 1 Since the PARTITION problem is not a strongly NP-complete problem (i.e., admits a pseudo-
polynomial time solution), the approximation-hardness result in Theorem 4 does not hold if the total pop-
ulation Pop(P) is polynomial in |P| (i.e., if Pop(P) = O(|P|c) for some positive constant c). Indeed, if
Pop(P) is polynomial in |P| then it is easy to design a polynomial-time exact solution via dynamic pro-
gramming for those instances of MIN-WVPκ problem that appear in the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. We reduce from the NP-complete PARTITION problem [15] which is defined as
follows: given a set of n positive integers A = {a0, . . . , an−1}, decide if there exists a subset A′ ⊂ A
such that
∑
ai∈A′ ai =
∑
aj /∈A′ aj . Note that we can assume without loss of generality that n is sufficiently
large and each of a0, . . . , an−1 is a multiple of any fixed positive integer. For notational convenience, let
∆ =
∑n−1
j=0 aj .
Let µ ≥ 0 be such that κ = 2 + µn (we will later show that µ is at most the constant 6ε1−ε ). Our
rectilinear polygon P , as illustrated in Fig. 2 (A), consists of a rectangle C = {pi,j | 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2}
of size 3× (n+ 1) with additional µn cells attached to it in any arbitrary manner to make the whole figure a
connected polygon without holes. For convenience, let D = {pi,j | pi,j /∈ C} be the set of the additional µn
cells. The relevant numbers for each cell are as follows:
Popi,j =

∆/2, if i = j = 0 or if i = 0, j = 2
aj , if i = 1 and j < n
∆, if pi,j ∈ D
0, otherwise
PartyAi,j =

∆/2, if i = j = 0
aj/2, if i = 1 and j < n
3∆/4, if pi,j ∈ D
0, otherwise
First, we show how to select a rational constant µ such that any integer κ in the range [ 2, ε|P| ] can be
realized. Assume that κ = ε′|P| ∈ [ 2, ε|P| ] for some ε′. Since |P| = 3(n + 1) + µn the following
calculations hold:
κ = 2 + µn = ε′|P| = ε′(3(n+ 1) + µn) ≡ µ = 3ε
′(n+ 1)− 2
(1− ε′)n <
4ε′
1− ε′ <
4ε
1− ε
Claim 4.1 Effgap(pi,j) = 0 for each pi,j ∈ D, and moreover each pi,j ∈ D must be a separate partition by
itself in any κ-equipartition of P .
Proof. By straightforward calculation, Effgap(pi,j) = 2 × 3∆4 − 3∆2 = 0. Since κ = 2 + µn and
Pop(P) = ∑pi,j∈P Popi,j = ∆ + ∆ +µn∆ = (2 +µn)∆, each partition in any κ-equipartition of P must
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(A)
∆ = 360
set of additional µn cellsD
0
1
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
n
10
5
30
15
40
20
50
25
60
30
80
40
90
45
0
0
Pop6,1
PartyA6,1
3× (n+ 1)
rectangle
of cells C
180
180
180
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
360
270
(B)
∆ = 360
Non-optimal efficiency gap 35∆ = 216
C1
C2
(C)
∆ = 360
Minimum efficiency gap 25∆ = 144
C1
C2
Figure 2: An illustration of the construction in the proof of Theorem 4 when the instance of the PARTITION
problem is A = {10, 30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 90}.
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have a population of Pop(P)κ = ∆ and thus each pi,j ∈ D of population ∆ must be a separate partition by
itself. q
Using Claim 4.1 we can simply ignore all pi,j ∈ D in the calculation of of efficiency gap of a valid
solution of P and it follows that the total efficiency gap of a κ-equipartition of P is identical to that of a
2-equipartition of C. A proof of the theorem then follows provided we prove the following two claims.
(soundness) If the PARTITION problem does not have a solution then OPT2(C) = ∆.
(completeness) If the PARTITION problem has a solution then OPT2(C) = 0.
Proof of soundness (refer to Fig. 2 (B))
Suppose that there exists a valid solution (i.e., a 2-equipartition) C1, C2 of MIN-WVP2 for C with p0,0 ∈
C1, p0,2 ∈ C2, and let A′ = {aj | p1,j ∈ C1}. Then,
∆ =
Pop(C)
2
= Pop0,0 +
∑
p1,j∈C1
Pop1,j =
∆
2
+
∑
aj∈A′
aj ≡
∑
aj∈A′
aj =
∆
2
and thus A′ is a valid solution of PARTITION, a contradiction!
Thus, assume that both p0,0 and p0,2 belong to the same partition, say C1. Then, since Pop0,0 +Pop0,4 =
∆ = Pop(C)2 , every p1,j must belong to C2. Moreover, every pi,j ∈ C with ηi,j = 0 must belong to C1 since
otherwise C1 will not be a connected region. This provides Pop(C1) = Pop(C2) = ∆, showing that C1, C2 is
indeed a valid solution (i.e., a 2-equipartition) of MIN-WVP2 for C. The total efficiency gap of this solution
can be calculated as
Effgap2(C, C1, C2) = |Effgap(C1) + Effgap(C2) |
=
∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(C1)− 32Pop(C1) + 2 PartyA(C1)− 32Pop(C1)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ 2∆2 − 32∆ + 2∆2 − 32∆
∣∣∣∣ = ∆
Proof of completeness (refer to Fig. 2 (C))
Suppose that there is a valid solution of A′ ⊂ A of PARTITION and consider the two polygons
C1 = {p2,j | 0 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪
{
p1,j | aj ∈ A′
}
, C2 = C \ C1
By straightforward calculation, it is easy to verify the following:
• Pop(C1) =
∑
aj∈A′ aj +
∑n
j=0 Pop2,j = ∆, Pop(C2) =
∑
aj /∈A′ aj +
∑n
j=0 Pop2,j = ∆, and thus
C1, C2 is a valid solution (i.e., a 2-equipartition) of MIN-WVP2 for C.
• Effgap2(C, C1, C2) = 0OPT2(C) = 0 since
Effgap2(C, C1, C2) = |Effgap(C1) + Effgap(C2) |
=
∣∣∣∣ 2 PartyA(C1)− 32Pop(C1) + 2 PartyA(C1)− 12Pop(C1)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 2 (∆2 + ∆4
)
− 3
2
∆ + 2
∆
4
− 1
2
∆
∣∣∣∣ = 0
q
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5 Efficient Algorithms Under Realistic Assumptions
Although Theorem 4 seems to render the problem MIN-WVPκ intractable in theory, our empirical results
show that the problem is computationally tractable in practice. This is because in real-life applications,
many constraints in the theoretical formulation of MIN-WVPκ are often relaxed. For example:
(i) Restricting district shapes: Individual partitions of the κ-equipartition of P may be restricted in shape.
For example, 37 states require their legislative districts to be reasonably compact and 18 states require
congressional districts to be compact [39].
(ii) Variations in district populations: A partitionQ1, . . . ,Qκ ofP is only approximately κ-equipartition,
i.e., Pop(Q1), . . . ,Pop(Qκ) are approximately, but not exactly, equal to Pop(P)/κ. For example, the usual
federal standards require equal population as nearly as is practicable for congressional districts but allow
more relaxed substantially equal population (e.g., no more than 10% deviation between the largest and
smallest district) for state and local legislative districts [39].
(iii) Bounding the efficiency gap measure away from zero: A κ-equipartitionQ1, . . . ,Qκ of P is a valid
solution only if Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) ≥ εPop(P) for some 0 < ε < 1. Indeed, the authors that
originally proposed the efficiency gap measure provided in [29, pp. 886-887] several reasons for not
requiring Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ)/Pop(P) to be either zero or too close to zero.
In this section, we explore algorithmic implications of these types of relaxations of constraints for MIN-
WVPκ.
5.1 The Case of Two Stable and Approximately Equal Partitions
This case considers constraints (ii) and (iii). The following definition of “near partitions” formalizes the
concept of variations in district populations.
Definition 5 (Near partitions) Let κ ∈ N, and let P be an instance of MIN-WVPκ. Let φ def= Qi, . . . ,Qκ
be such that Q1, . . . ,Qκ is a partition of P , such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, we have(
1
κ
− δ
)
· Pop(P) ≤ Pop(Qi) ≤
(
1
κ
+ δ
)
· Pop(P),
for some δ ≥ 0. Then we say that φ is a δ-near partition.
The next definition of “stability” formalizes the concept of bounding away from zero the efficiency gap
of each partition.
Definition 6 (Stability) Let κ ∈ N, let P be an instance of MIN-WVPκ, and let φ def= Q1, . . . ,Qκ be a
partition for P . We say that φ is γ-stable, for some γ > 0, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, we have
Effgap(Qi) > γ · Pop(Qi).
Definition 7 (Canonical solution) Let P be an instance of MIN-WVP2. Let t ∈ N. Let B be the partition
of P obtained as follows: We partition P into bm/tc·cn/tc rectangles, where each rectangle consists of the
intersection of t rows with t columns, except possibly for the rectangles that are incident to the right-most
and the bottom-most boundaries of P . We refer to the rectangles in B as t-basic (see figure 3). Let T be
the set of cells consisting of the union of the left-most column of P , the top row of P , and for each t-basic
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Figure 3: The 10-basic rectangles of a 32 × 32 grid (left), the 10-basic tree (middle), and a 10-canonical
solution (right).
rectangle X , the bottom row of X , and the right-most column of X , except for the cell that is next to the top
cell of that column (see figure 3). We refer to T as the t-basic tree For each t-basic rectangle X , we define
its interior to be the set of cells in X that are at distance at least 2 from T . A solution φ def= Z1,Z2 of P is
called t-canonical if it satisfies the following properties.
(1) T ⊆ Z1.
(2) Let X be a t-basic rectangle, and let X ′ be its interior. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ai be the set of
connected components of X ′ ∩ Zi. Then, for each Y ∈ A1, there exists a unique cell in T1 that is
adjacent to both Y and T . Moreover, all other cells in X \ (X ′ ∪ T ) are in Z2 (see Figure 3).
Lemma 8 Let P be an instance of MIN-WVP2. Suppose that there are no empty cells and the maximum
number of people in any cell of P is C. Let γ > 0, and suppose that there exists a γ-stable solution
φ
def
= Q1,Q2 for P . Then, for any ε > 0, at least one of the following conditions hold:
(1) Either Q1 or Q2 is contained in some 1/ε-basic rectangle.
(2) There exists a d1/εe-canonical δ-near solution φ′ = Q′1,Q′2 ofP , for some δ = O(εC), such that for all
i ∈ {1, 2}, we have |PartyA(Qi)−PartyA(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεn+m), and |PartyB(Qi)−PartyB(Q′i)| ≤
O(Cεnm).
Proof. It suffices to show that if condition (1) does not hold, then condition (2) does. We define a partition
φ′ def= Q′1,Q′2 of P as follows. We initialize Q′1 to be empty. Let T be the 1/ε-basic tree. We add T1 to Q′1.
For each 1/ε-basic rectangle X , let X ′ be its interior. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ai be the set of connected
components of X ′ ∩ Q1. Since φ is a valid solution, we have that Q1 is connected. Since condition (1)
does not hold, it follows that Q1 intersects at least two 1/ε-basic rectangles. Therefore, each component
W ∈ A1 must contain some cell cW on the boundary of X ′. By construction, cW must be incident to some
cell c′W that is incident to T . We add c
′
W to Q′1. Repeating this process for all basic rectangles, and for all
components W as above. Finally, we define Q′2 = P \ Q′1. This completes the definition of the partition
φ′ def= Q′1,Q′2 of P . It remains to show that this is the desired solution.
First, we need to show that φ′ is a valid solution. To that end, it suffices to show that both Q′1 and Q′2
are connected. The fact that Q′1 is connected follows directly from its construction. To show that Q′2 is
connected we proceed by induction on the construction of Q′1. Initially, Q′1 consists of just the cells in T ,
and thus its complement is clearly connected. When we consider a componentW , we addW ∪{c′W } toQ′1.
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Since we add only a single cell that is incident to both W and Q′1, it follows inductively that Q′1 remains
simply connected (that is, it does not contain any holes), and therefore its complement remains connected.
This concludes the proof that both Q′1 and Q′2 are connected, and therefore φ′ is a valid solution.
The solutions φ and φ′ can disagree only on cells that are not in the interior of any basic rectangle. All
these cells are contained in the union of O(εm) rows and (εn) columns. Thus, the total number of voters in
these cells is at mostO(Cεnm). It follows that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, we have |PartyA(Qi)−PartyA(Q′i)| ≤
O(Cεnm), and |PartyB(Qi)− PartyB(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεnm).
Since there are no empty cells, we have Pop(P) ≥ nm. It follows that for all i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
|Pop(Qi)− Pop(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεnm) ≤ C · ε · Pop(P).
Thus φ′ is δ-near, for some δ = O(εC), which concludes the proof. q
Lemma 9 Let γ > 0. Let P be an instance of MIN-WVP2. Suppose that there are no empty cells and
the maximum number of people in any cell of P is C. Suppose that there exists a δ-stable partition φ def=
Q1,Q2 of P . Then, for any fixed ε > 0, there exists an algorithm which given P computes some δ-near
partition φ′ def= Q′1,Q′2 of P , for some δ = O(εC), such that for all i ∈ {1, 2}, we have |PartyA(Qi) −
PartyA(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεnm), and |PartyB(Qi)− PartyB(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεnm), in time 2O(1/ε
2)(nmC)O(1).
Proof. We can check whether there exist a partition φ def= Q1,Q2 satisfying the conditions, and such
that either Q1 or Q1 is contained in the interior of a single 1/ε-basic rectangle. This can be done by
trying all 1/ε-basic rectangles, and all possible subsets of the interior of each 1/ε-basic rectangle, in time
(n/ε)(m/ε)2O(1/ε
2) = nm2O(1/ε
2).
It remains to consider the case where neither of Q1 and Q2 is contained in the interior of any 1/ε-basic
rectangle. It follows that condition (2) of Lemma 8 holds. That is, there exists some d1/εe-canonical δ-near
solution φ′ def= Q′1,Q′2 of P , for some δ = O(εC), such that for all i ∈ {1, 2}, we have |PartyA(Qi) −
PartyA(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεn + m), and |PartyB(Qi) − PartyB(Q′i)| ≤ O(Cεnm). We can compute such
a partition φ′ via dynamic programming, as follows. Let I be the union of the interiors of all 1/ε-basic
rectangles. By the definition of a canonical partition, it suffices to compute Q′1 ∩ I and Q′2 ∩ I . Since
Q′2 ∩ I = I \ (Q′1 ∩ I), it suffices to compute Q′1 ∩ I . Let LPartyA = PartyA(Q′1 ∩ I), and LPartyB =
PartyB(Q′1 ∩ I). Clearly, LPartyA, LPartyB ∈ {0, . . . , Cnm}. Thus there are at most O((nmC)2) different
values for the pair (LPartyA, LPartyB). We construct a dynamic programming table, containing one entry for
each possible value for the pair (LPartyA, LPartyB). Initially, all entries of the table are unmarked, except
for the entry that corresponds to the pair (0, 0). We iteratively consider all 1/ε-basic rectangles. When
considering some 1/ε-basic rectangle X , with interior X ′, we enumerate all possibilities for Y = X ′ ∩Q′1.
There are 2O(1/ε
2) possibilities for Y . For each such possibility, we update the dynamic programming table
by marking the position (i+ PartyA(Y ), j + PartyB(Y )), if the position (i, j) is already marked from the
previous iteration. The total running time is 2O(1/ε
2)(nmC)O(1). q
Theorem 10 Let γ > 0. Let P be an instance of MIN-WVP2. Suppose that there are no empty cells and
the maximum number of people in any cell of P is C. Suppose that there exists a δ-stable γ-near partition
φ
def
= Q1,Q2 of P . Then, for any fixed ε > 0, there exists an algorithm which given P computes some
δ-near partition φ′ def= Q′1,Q′2 of P , for some δ = O(εC), such that Effgap(φ′) ≤ (1 + ε)Effgap(φ), in time
2O(1/ε
2)2O(C/δ)
2
(nmC)O(1).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 9 by setting ε = min{ε,O(δ/C)}. q
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5.2 The Case of Convex Shaped Partitions
This case encompasses constraint (i) since convexity has been used in gerrymandering studies such as [40]
as a measure of compactness to examine how redistricting reshapes the geography of congressional districts.
We recall that someX ⊆ R2 is called y-convex if for every vertical line `, we have thatX∩` is either empty,
or a line segment. We also say that a κ-partition Q1, . . . , Qκ of P is y-convex if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, Qi
is y-convex.
Theorem 11 Let P be a rectilinear polygon realized in the m × n grid, and let N = Pop(P) be the total
population on P . There exists an algorithm for computing a y-convex κ-equipartition of P of minimum
efficiency gap, with running time NO(κ). In particular, the running time is polynomial when the total
population is polynomial and the total number of partitions is a constant.
Proof. Let P∗ = Q∗1, . . . ,Q∗κ be a y-convex κ-equipartition of P of minimum efficiency gap. For any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Ci be the i-th column of P . We observe that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and for all j ∈
{1, . . . , κ}, we have that Q∗j ∩ Ci is either empty, or consists of a single rectangle of width 1. Let Ci be the
set of all partitions of Ci into exactly κ (possibly empty) segments, each labeled with a unique integer in
{1, . . . , κ}. We further define
a∗i,j = PartyA(Q∗j ∩ (C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ci)),
and
b∗i,j = PartyB(Q∗j ∩ (C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ci)).
The algorithm proceeds via dynamic programming. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Ii = N2κ × Si. Let
Xi = (ai,1, bi,1, . . . , ai,κ, bi,κ,Zi) ∈ Ii. If i = 1, then we say that Xi is feasible if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , κ},
the unique set Y ∈ Z1 labeled j satisfies
a1,j = PartyA(Y ) and b1,j = PartyB(Y ).
Otherwise, if i > 1, we say that Xi is feasible if the following holds: There exists some feasible Xi−1 =
(ai−1,1, bi−1,1, . . . , ai−1,κ, bi−1,κ,Zi−1) ∈ Ii−1, such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, we have that the unique
set Y ∈ Zi labeled j satisfies
ai,j = ai−1,j + PartyA(Y ) and bi,j = bi−1,j + PartyB(Y ).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we inductively compute the set Fi of all feasible Xi ∈ Ii. This can clearly be done
in time NO(κ). It is immediate that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists some Xi ∈ Ii that achieves efficiency
gap equal to the restriction of P∗ on the union of the first i columns. Thus, by induction on i, the algorithm
computes a feasible solution with optimal efficiency gap. q
6 Experimental Results for Real Data on Four Gerrymandered States
To show that it is indeed possible in practice to solve the problem of minimization of the efficiency gap,
we design a fast randomized algorithm based on the local search paradigm for this problem. Our algorithm
starts with a givenQ1, . . . ,Qκ partition of the input state P . Note thatQ1, . . . ,Qκ was only an approximate
equipartition in the sense that the values Pop(Q1), . . . ,Pop(Qκ) are as close to each other as practically
possible but need not be exactly equal (cf. US Supreme Court ruling in Karcher v. Daggett 1983). For
designing alternate valid district plans, we therefore allow any partition Q′1, . . . ,Q′κ of P such that, for
every j, min1≤i≤κ {Pop(Qi)} ≤ Pop(Q′j) ≤ max1≤i≤κ {Pop(Qi)}.
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6.1 Input preprocessing
We preprocess the input map to generate an undirected unweighted planar graph G = (V,E). Each node in
the graph corresponds to a planar subdivision of a county that is assigned to a district (or to an entire county if
it is assigned to a district as a whole). Two nodes are connected by an edge if and only if they share a border
on the map. Each node v ∈ V has three corresponding numbers: PartyA(v) (total number of voters for
Party A), PartyB(v) = (total number of voters for Party B), and Pop(v) = PartyA(v) + PartyB(v) (total
population in v)3. A district Q is then a connected sub-graph of G with PartyA(Q) = ∑v∈Q PartyA(v)
and PartyB(Q) = ∑v∈Q PartyB(v).
6.2 Availability and Format of Raw Data
Link to all data files for the three states used in the paper are available in http://www.cs.uic.edu/
˜dasgupta/gerrymander/index.html. Each data is an EXCEL spreadsheet. Explanations of var-
ious columns of the spreadsheet are as follows:
Column 1: District: This column identifies the district number of the county in column 3.
Column 2: County id: Column 1 and column 2 together form an unique identifier for the counties in
column 3. A county is identified by its County id (column 2) and the District (column 1) it belongs
to. This was specifically needed to identify and differentiate the counties that belonged to more than
one district.
The software considers the counties belonging to different districts as separate entities.
Column 3: County: This column contains the name of the county.
Column 4: Republicans: This contains the total number of votes in favor of the Republican party (GOP)
in the county identified by column 1 and column 2.
Column 4: Democrats: This contains the total number of votes in favor of the Democratic party in the
county identified by column 1 and column 2.
Column 5: Neighbors: This column contains information about the “neighboring counties” of the given
county. Neighboring counties represent the counties that share a boundary with the county identified
by column 1 and column 2. Individual neighbors are separated by commas.
6.3 The Local-search Heuristic
Informally, our algorithm starts with the existing (possibly gerrymandered) districts and then repeatedly
attempts to reassign counties (or parts of counties) into neighboring districts. This was done on a semi-
random basis, and on average about 100 iterations were carried out in each run. Each time a county (or a
part of a county) was shifted, the efficiency gap was calculated to check if it was less than the prior efficiency
gap. Exact details of our algorithm are shown in Fig. 4.
One cannot provide any theoretical analysis of the randomized algorithm in Fig. 4 because no such
analysis is possible (due to Theorem 4) as stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 12 Assuming P 6= NP (respectively, RP 6= NP), there exists no deterministic local-search algo-
rithms (respectively, randomized local-search algorithms) that reaches a solution with a finite approximation
ratio in polynomial time starting at any non-optimal valid solution.
3We ignore negligible “third-party” votes, i.e., votes for candidates other than the democratic and republican parties.
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start with the current districts, say Q1, . . . ,Qκ
repeat µ times (∗ µ was set to 100 in actual run ∗)
select a random r from the set {0, 1, . . . , k} for some 0 < k < |V | (∗ k = 20 in actual run ∗)
select r nodes v1, . . . , vr from G at random (∗ Note that a node is a county or part of a county ∗)
counties done← ∅
for each vi do
if all neighbors of vi do not belong to the same district as vi then
if vi /∈ counties done then
add vi to counties done
for every neighbor vj of vi do
if assigning vi to the district of vj produces no district with disconnected parts then
assign vi to the district of one of its neighbors
recalculate new districts, say Q′1, . . . ,Q′κ
if min1≤i≤κ {Pop(Qi)} ≤ Pop(Q′j) ≤ max1≤i≤κ {Pop(Qi)} for every j then
if Effgapκ(P,Q′1, . . . ,Q′κ) < Effgapκ(P,Q1, . . . ,Qκ) then
Q1 ← Q′1 ; Q2 ← Q′2 ; . . . . . . ; Qκ ← Q′κ
endif
endif
endif
endfor
endif
endif
endfor
endrepeat
Figure 4: A local search algorithm for computing efficiency gap. The algorithm was implemented using the
PYTHON language.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Theorem 4 once observes that the specific instance of the MIN-WVPκ
problem created in the reduction of the theorem has exactly one (trivial) non-optimal solution and every
other valid solution is an optimal solution. q
6.4 Results and Implications
Our resulting software was tested on four electoral data for the 2012 election of the (federal) house of repre-
sentatives for the US states of Wisconsin [35, 36], Texas [37, 38], Virginia [33, 34] and Pennsylvania [31, 32].
Some summary statistics for these data are shown in Table 1. The results of running the local-search algo-
rithm in Fig. 4 on the four real data-sets are tabulated in Table 2, and the corresponding maps are shown in
Fig. 5–8. The results computed by our algorithm are truly outstanding: the final efficiency gap was lowered
to 3.80%, 3.33%, 3.61% and 8.64% from 14.76%, 4.09%, 22.25% and 23.80% for Wisconsin, Texas, Vir-
ginia and Pennsylvania, respectively, in a small amount of time. Our empirical results clearly show that it is
very much possible to design and implement a very fast algorithm that can “un-gerrymander” (with respect
to the efficiency gap measure) the gerrymandered US house districts of three US states.
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Vote share Number of Seats Normalized efficiency gap
Democrats GOP Democrats GOP (current)
PartyA(P)
Pop(P)
PartyB(P)
Pop(P) Effgapκ(P, . . . . . . )/Pop(P)
Wisconsin 50.75% 49.25% 3 5 14.76%
Texas 43.65% 56.35% 12 24 4.09%
Virginia 51.96% 48.04% 4 7 22.25%
Pennsylvania 50.65% 49.35% 5 13 23.80%
Table 1: Summary statistics for 2012 election data for election of the (federal) house of representatives for
the states of Texas, Wisconsin, Virginia and Pennsylvania.
A closer look at the new district maps shown in Fig. 5–8 also reveal the following interesting insights:
Seat gain vs. efficiency gap. Lowering the efficiency gap from 15% to 3.75% for the state of Wisconsin
did not affect the total seat allocation (3 democrats vs. 5 republicans) between the two parties. Indeed,
this further reinforces the assertion in [29] that the efficiency gap and partisan symmetry are different
concepts, and thus fewer absolute difference of wasted votes does not necessarily lead to seat gains
for the loosing party.
Compactness vs. efficiency gap. The new district maps for the state of Virginia reveals an interesting as-
pect. Our new district map have fewer districts that are oddly shaped compared to the map used for
the 2012 election4, even though minimizing wasted votes does not take into consideration shapes of
districts.
How natural are gerrymandered districts? Since our algorithm applies a sequence of carefully chosen
semi-random perturbations to the original gerrymandered districts to drastically lower the absolute
difference of wasted votes, one can hypothesize that the original gerrymandered districts are far from
being a product of arbitrarily random decisions. However, to reach a definitive conclusion regarding
this point, one would need to construct a suitable null model, which we do not have yet.
4Virginia is one of the most gerrymandered states in the country, both on the congressional and state levels, based on lack of
compactness and contiguity of its districts. Virginia congressional districts are ranked the 5th worst in the country because counties
and cities are broken into multiple pieces to create heavily partisan districts [41].
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Number of Seats Normalized efficiency gap
Original New Effgapκ(P, . . . . . . )/Pop(P)
Democrats GOP Democrats GOP Original New
Wisconsin 3 5 3 5 14.76% 3.80%
Texas 12 24 12 24 4.09% 3.33%
Virginia 3 8 5 6 22.25% 3.61%
Pennsylvania 5 13 6 12 23.80% 8.64%
Table 2: Redistricting results obtained by running the algorithm in Fig. 4 for the states of Texas, Wisconsin,
Virginia and Pennsylvania in comparison to the 2012 district plans.
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(A)
(B)
Figure 5: The district maps of Wisconsin: (A) original [36] and (B) after applying our local search algorithm
in Fig. 4.
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(A)
(B)
Figure 6: The district maps of Texas: (A) original [38] and (B) after applying our local search algorithm in
Fig. 4.
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(A)
(B)
Figure 7: The district maps of Virginia: (A) original [34] and (B) after applying our local search algorithm
in Fig. 4.
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(A)
(B)
Figure 8: The district maps of Pennsylvania: (A) original [32] and (B) after applying our local search
algorithm in Fig. 4.
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7 Conclusion and future research
In this article we have performed algorithmic analysis of the recently introduced efficiency gap measure
for gerrymandering both from a theoretical (computational complexity) as well as a practical (software
development and testing on real data) point of view. The main objective of the paper was to provide a
scientific analysis of the efficiency gap measure and to provide a crucial supporting hand to remove partisan
gerrymandering should the US courts decide to recognize efficiency gap as at least a partially valid measure
of gerrymandering. Of course, final words on resolving gerrymandering is up to the US judicial systems.
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